got [the petitioner's] name, date of birth, and we were able to pull up a picture—his [Department of Correction] picture on the computer within the cruiser." The petitioner claims that this information "clearly inform[ed] the jury that [the petitioner] ha[d] been previously arrested, convicted, and sentenced" and that "the jury was then aware that the subject conviction involved the [victim]."

The petitioner argues that the use of such prior misconduct evidence was "inherently prejudicial" and necessitated a limiting instruction. He misapprehends our holding in *State* v. *Huckabee*, 41 Conn. App. 565, 574, 677 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 903, 682 A.2d 1009 (1996), for the proposition that trial counsel must request a limiting instruction when prior misconduct evidence is presented, and, as a result, that failing to request one was per se prejudicial for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In *Huckabee*, this court determined that the state's introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior escapes from a juvenile detention center was proper after the defendant "opened the door to such inquiry," but that the "introduction of the . . . escapes prior to this prosecution, however, should have been accompanied by a limiting instruction that the evidence was to be used solely for the purpose of evaluating the defendant's veracity" and that the "nature of this evidence . . . requires a limiting instruction." Id. The petitioner fails to recognize, however, that in *Huckabee*, which was a direct criminal appeal, not a habeas action, the defendant raised an evidentiary claim that required him to prove that it was "reasonably probable that the jury was misled by the failure to give a limiting instruction." Id. 575. Here, the petitioner is not making an evidentiary claim. Rather, he is claiming that Lorenzen provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that claim requires a standard different from the claim in *Huckabee*. Instead of

determining whether it was "reasonably probable that the jury was misled" by the lack of a limiting instruction, we are charged with the two prong *Strickland* standard and may decide the matter against the petitioner on either the performance or the prejudice prong. *Lewis* v. *Commissioner of Correction*, supra, 165 Conn. App. 451.

In the present case, we conclude that the petitioner's claim fails because the state's case against the petitioner was strong and thus the petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. We do not agree with the petitioner that the "introduction of prior acts of misconduct and prior incarceration effectively bolstered a case which found no other support beyond the mere accusation [of the victim]." There is no reasonable probability that, had evidence of the petitioner's prior misconduct not been introduced, or had its introduction been properly limited, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Quaglini testified that he and Officer Robert Iovanna, the other responding officer, went to 104 Ward Street in search of the petitioner after interviewing the victim and observed the petitioner standing on the front steps. Upon approaching the petitioner, the petitioner "made eye contact and he immediately spun around [and] ripped the door open." Quaglini stated that he ordered the petitioner to stop, but the petitioner did not comply and instead "ran up the stairs." Quaglini "chased him up the stairs into the apartment, ran through the apartment down the back stairs out of the back of the house [and] ran back around to Ward Street." Quaglini further testified that the petitioner was "hopping fences" and running through backyards in an effort to evade him. Quaglini followed him to a parking lot located at 913 Broad Street and found the petitioner hiding under a motor vehicle.